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Executive Summary 
 
Background 
 
The following report considers a number of key challenges the Australian Federal Government faces 
in designing the regulatory framework and the reach of its planned mandatory internet filter. Previous 
reports on the mandatory filtering scheme have concentrated on the filtering technologies, their 
efficacy, their cost and their likely impact on the broadband environment. This report focuses on the 
scope and the nature of content that is likely to be caught by the proposed filter and on identifying 
associated public policy implications.  
 
We recognise that the Federal Government faces real challenges in balancing the risks posed by the 
online media environment with the opportunities that environment presents. In preparing this report, 
the authors acknowledge that the Federal Government is still considering the detail of how mandatory 
filtering will be implemented and how classification will work under the scheme. Our research is not 
intended to pre-empt those decisions but to offer constructive input, to highlight key public policy 
challenges and to inform public dialogue. 
 
This report was prepared by three senior academics in the media studies field, Professor Catharine 
Lumby, Professor Lelia Green and Professor John Hartley. We have all published extensively on the 
issues of online media, media content regulation, young people and media consumption, and public 
policy. As members of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, we are 
currently collaborating on a large research project that considers the risks and opportunities for 
children in the online and mobile media era. The research on which this report is based was 
supported by the Internet Industry Association and we acknowledge their assistance. We would also 
like acknowledge the input of Professor Stuart Cunningham, Director of the ARC Centre of Excellence 
for Creative Industries and Innovation at QUT, and the research assistance of Paul Taylor. 
 
The Federal Government faces unprecedented challenges in media content regulation. The online 
environment is one in which media consumers are increasingly becoming media producers, with 
enormously varying levels of skill and distribution. The means of distribution and consumption range 
across content developed and distributed by established media organizations, through emerging 
online sites, to amateur and peer-to-peer content.  
 
A neglected aspect of public policy that needs to be considered in the internet filtering debate is the 
question of how we sensibly balance the risks posed by online material, particularly to children, and 
the opportunities provided to the broader community to participate in sometimes controversial 
debates, to access and debate material pertaining to political and social issues, and to allow 
reasonable adults to make decisions about what they consume or produce online. 
 
Australia’s current system for regulating media content has evolved erratically, reactively and 
inconsistently. The Federal Government has inherited not only the challenges of the new media era 
but equally the deficiencies of the regulatory regime developed for past media eras. It is clear that 
Australia needs to avoid simply applying an inadequate and inconsistent media content regulation 
regime to a very different and emergent media landscape. There is a clear need to rethink media 
content regulation in the online era –a need supported by the research detailed in the body of this 
report.  
The challenge of regulating media content in the online era is also an opportunity to examine the 
rationale of media content regulation from first principles and to engage the public and all 
stakeholders in a dialogue about the purpose and scope of classification. 
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Key Findings 
 
On the basis of our survey of international research, we argue that Australia should not apply a 
system of media content classification that already treats different media inconsistently to the online 
environment without any consideration of the existing flaws in regulation and the complex 
particularities of the online world. The internet is not a medium: it is a whole new media environment 
which requires us to rethink how we regulate content, protect vulnerable groups and define the 
relationship between media consumers and media producers.  
 
One of the clear risks of focusing disproportionate public policy attention and public resources on 
content regulation is that many parents and teachers may gain a false sense of security when it 
comes to the material their children encounter online. This risk is particularly high in a regulatory 
system that relies on a blacklist which, by its very nature, will only capture and represent a small 
sample of the online material of concern.  
 
 
1. Scope of Content 
 
One of the often stated aims of the Federal Government’s internet filter is to prevent access to child 
pornography12. No serious commentator could question the importance of shutting down the 
production and distribution of child abuse materials or of blocking access to other categories of the 
content the great majority of Australians find abhorrent, including bestiality and active incitement to 
violence. Yet if the mandatory internet filtering proceeds on the basis of the current approach to opt-in 
voluntary filtering of material hosted overseas- via a blacklist maintained by the Australian 
Communication and Media Authority – a far broader variety of material than that represented at the 
extreme end of the spectrum may be caught.  
 
In December 2009, Minister Conroy announced that the RC category would be used as a basis for 
mandatory filtering of the internet at ISP level in Australia. This submission addresses some public 
law and policy concerns about the efficacy of using that category as a basis for filtering. 
The current proposal indicates that the list of mandatorily filtered sites will be based on the RC 
category. The key issue that arises here is that the RC category – developed primarily as a 
classification code for film and video – is a broad category which invites broad legal and quasi-legal 
interpretation. 
In Australia, much material which falls outside the R 18+ category moves into the RC category 
because the X 18+ category excludes any material that depicts violence. The broad range of material 
that is produced for and distributed on the internet, including news, current affairs and other material 
of public interest, may well be caught on the basis that a classification regime intended for film and 
video is applied to an online environment where multiple producers and consumers intersect.  
The interpretation of the RC category on its own also opens an array of potential issues given the 
breadth of the purpose and audience for online material. The Classification Act does not offer detailed 
criteria for determining whether content is RC. Rather, it states that material be classified in 
accordance with the principles in the National Classification Code. These guidelines are extremely 
broad. 
The cases referred to in this report strongly suggest that interpretations of what is deemed part of the 
RC category is one the courts are inclined to leave to the discretion of the Classification Board and 
Review Board. This is of real concern for an online environment in which the range, scope and 
purpose of material is far wider than that encountered in films produced for entertainment purposes. 
Adding weight to this concern is that one of the factors that the Classification Act states must be taken 
into account when classifying material is “the persons or class of persons to or amongst whom it is 
published or intended or likely to be published”. This provision reflects a set of assumptions about the 
way material is generated and consumed which map onto the traditional media environment but which 
become almost meaningless in an era where material migrates rapidly across many contexts and 
where an enormous amount of content is generated by consumers themselves. 
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In the report we consider some hypothetical examples of material that could well be deemed RC and 
mandatorily filtered out of the Australian internet. Potential material that could feasibly be deemed RC 
on the basis of the current Classification Code includes: 
 A site devoted to debating the merits of euthanasia in which some participants exchanged 
information about actual euthanasia practices. 
 A site set up by a community organisation to promote harm minimisation in recreational drug 
use. 
 A site designed to give a safe space for young gay and lesbians to meet and discuss their 
sexuality in which some members of the community narrated explicit sexual experiences. 
 A site that included dialogue and excerpts from literary classic such as Nabokov’s Lolita  or 
sociological studies into sexual experiences, such as Dr Alfred Kinsey’s famous Adult Sexual 
Behaviour in the Human Male.  
 A site devoted to discussing the geo-political causes of terrorism that published material 
outlining the views of terrorist organisations as reference material. 
 
2. Transparency 
 
Another critical question raised by the prospect of a mandatory filtering system is whether the public 
will have the right to know what is on the blacklist, the right to appeal decisions to place material on 
the blacklist and a consequent right to judicial review. There are clear public policy reasons for 
denying access to some categories of material on this kind of list – for example, information that might 
facilitate access to child pornography or compromise national security. However, if the range and 
nature of material potentially blacklisted extends well beyond these categories then there are some 
clear public law principles that require attention. We need to consider what material on the blacklist 
will not be released and for what reason. We also need a clear policy and regulatory framework that 
spells out who is able to access the list and who will have legal standing to appeal content caught by 
the list.  
 
A related concern here is that if parents and other who care for or educate children are unaware of 
the size and content of the blacklist they may have a false sense of security and fail to properly 
supervise young people’s online activities. It is critical, in this regard, that the public is informed about 
how extensive the blacklist is and what kind of material it catches. 
 
 
3. International Context 
 
The proposed public model of mandatory internet filtering would separate Australia from the great 
bulk of western liberal democracies who have opted for industry self or co regulatory approaches. It is 
clear that liberal democracies tend to adopt voluntary regulatory approaches that focus on narrowly 
defined segments of undesirable content – usually child pornography. In the European Union, for 
example, the filtering regime requires interaction between governments, police, advocacy groups and 
the general public who identify instances of undesirable content, and the ISPs who voluntarily filter 
such content on the understanding that any failure to do so is likely to result in greater regulation of 
the sector. There is general consensus on the material that is considered illegal or harmful and this 
includes: child pornography, human trafficking, racist material, material promoting terrorism and all 
forms of internet fraud. 
 
While it is clearly important that Australians make our own decisions about managing the risks and 
opportunities posed by the online media environment, we submit that it is equally important that we 
take into account how those decisions place us in relation to comparable democracies and to explore 
the evidenced-based options that have informed policy-making in other jurisdictions. 
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4. Balancing Rights and Managing Risk 
If the government were to implement a mandatory filter, the extent to which this would conflict with the 
right to freedom of speech and access to information is uncertain although it is clear that the scope of 
the content caught would certainly increase the level of the conflict. Our governments have a clear 
obligation to protect national security, the public order and to uphold public morals. They also have an 
obligation to consider how to balance and protect freedom of speech and association. In the online 
and mobile media era balancing these obligations becomes increasingly difficult: both in terms of 
policy orientation and detail. The Federal Government in Australia faces an unprecedented scenario 
in which media consumers have become media producers and distributors online and in which the 
means of hosting and producing material proliferate hourly.  
The clear issue at this juncture is whether mandatory internet filtering, via a blacklist, is the most 
appropriate method to go forward in terms of balancing rights and blocking the worst category of 
content. There is evidence to suggest that all systems can be evaded by some internet users and that 
no technical means of filtering can be implemented that prevents such evasion. The question as to 
whether overfiltering or underfiltering is preferable remains a matter that individual states must decide. 
While it seems that many states have delegated responsibility to individual ISPs, this question raises 
two important public policy questions: 
 In the case of overfiltering: is the potential of unwittingly restricting the lawful expression of 
a citizen and their access to information so offensive to fundamental human rights that it 
conceivably constitutes a breach of Australia’s international obligations?  
 In the case of underfiltering: is the inexact implementation of internet filtering satisfactory 
given that much content which may be deemed grossly offensive to public morals will not be 
successfully blocked and may also leave parents and teachers with a false sense of security 
when it comes to children accessing the internet? 
The growth of peer-to-peer online networks generate some additional regulatory challenges for the 
Federal Government. A mandatory filter will not catch illegal material disseminated through these 
channels. Indeed, one of the key challenges in identifying those who disseminate and consume child 
pornography is that much of it is not openly displayed on websites but is exchanged in a covert and 
encrypted manner via bulletin boards. More recently, evidence is emerging that child pornography is 
also increasingly being covertly housed on third party websites through the use of malware bots. The 
international evidence clearly suggests that the majority of child abuse prevention resources need to 
be targeted towards coordinated policing of those who manufacture and share child abuse materials, 
often in contexts where they are involving their own family members or children known to them.  
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1.0  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This report investigates the scope and nature of content likely to be included in the Australian Federal 
Government’s planned introduction of a mandatory internet filter, how this compares to international 
practice and what public policy issues may flow from this change. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
Our report considers the following key issues: 
 
 What is the Federal Government’s current policy on internet filtering, particularly in relation to 
the scope of material to be caught by proposed filtering?  
 What public policy considerations should the Government take into account in seeking to 
implement its current policy? 
 What are the matters of public interest in regard to the potential impact of such filtering on 
democratic debate, access to information, cultural vitality and freedom of speech? 
 Where should the line be drawn in terms of striking a balance between a need to protect 
Australians from harmful material and the rights of adult citizens to freedom of expression and 
the right to information and to access material which is not itself illegal? 
 What are the different categories/types of content that could be blocked under this filtering 
proposal? 
 What are the options open to the Federal Government when it comes to deciding what 
categories and types of content should be blocked? 
 In relation to these categories (including child abuse material, 'Refused Classification' 
material, and harmful/inappropriate content) what are the challenges implicit in filtering such 
material including:  
o How (clearly) are they defined in Australian law;  
o How are they currently handled in terms of regulation and law enforcement;  
o How would the filtering of that scope of material compare with international practice;  
o What issues of freedom of expression, access to information, public acceptance of 
the usefulness/legitimacy of filtering, and government control (or even censorship) of 
content would arise?  
o Other similar factors thought to be relevant by the research team will also be 
considered here. 
 What challenges and concerns arise in relation to applying existing regulatory frameworks for 
traditional media (e.g. the RC category) in an online context? 
 What is international practice around the scope of material filtered in other jurisdictions? 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
This report is based on an international literature review on approaches to internet filtering, the scope 
of content filtered and the public policy issues that arise from different approaches. It also includes a 
comprehensive review of published Australian documents on the proposed mandatory internet filter. 
Primary documents such as policy factsheets, ministerial press releases and departmental reports 
were reviewed. This activity was complemented by an exhaustive search of relevant media reportage 
of the issue in addition to current scholarly research. Relevant Hansard, legislation and case law was 
also consulted to establish the framework in which online censorship currently operates.   
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1.4 Internet Filtering Terminology 
 
Although a discussion on the specifics of filtering technology is beyond the scope of this report, it is 
necessary to provide a working knowledge of the circumstances under which filtering technology can 
be applied. Internet filtering can be implemented at three levels: 
 On the centralised backbone of a nation’s internet infrastructure, 
 At the decentralised Internet Service Provider (ISP) level; or 
 At the individual PC level  
 
Filtering can also be mandatory or voluntary. That is, governments can apply a mandatory filter on the 
nation’s internet infrastructure. Otherwise they can regulate that ISPs apply a mandatory filter that 
filters content. Alternatively, governments have the option to allow ISPs to voluntary implement 
filtering software on their products or provide individual PCs users with appropriate filtering software 
that they freely apply to their own PCs. 
 
Filtering technology is a complicated process with a number of different options available. For a brief 
overview of the options available to governments or ISPs see Appendix One. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Report  
 
This report is structured into the following five sections: 
 
Section 1 introduces the report and provides a brief overview of the evolution of media 
content regulation in Australia and considers some of the broad public policy principles that 
need to be balanced in designing a regime for future media content regulation. 
 
Section 2 provides an overview of the current Federal Government’s stated policy concerning 
internet filtering. It also discusses the type of content that is likely to be filtered, how this 
content is determined in law and the potential legal challenges to this law. 
 
Section 3 discusses the international practices of internet filtering. It considers how other 
western liberal democracies have approached internet censorship and compares how 
Australia’s proposed filtering policy compares with these, and with countries not currently 
aligned with western liberal democracies. 
 
Section 4 explore the key public policy issues raised by mandatory internet filtering in relation 
to the potential scope and nature of the content filtered. 
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1.6 Media Content Regulation in Australia 
 
In this first section, we introduce and background the key public policy issues identified in this report: 
the question of whether the Australian federal government should apply a classification regime built 
on the foundation of a very different media landscape to the current online environment. We see this 
as a threshold issue for any debate about the scope and form of content that will or should be caught 
in a mandatory filtering system.  
 
 
Media Content Regulation: Background 
 
The current Federal Government has inherited a complex and inconsistent system for regulating 
media content. Over many decades, content regulation in Australia has evolved in an ad hoc manner 
and on the basis of political expediency, across the political spectrum. Our research into the history of 
this regulation strongly suggests that Australian media classification systems have not, to date, been 
built on sufficient empirical evidence about actual public attitudes or on evidence about actual media 
consumer behaviour. In saying this, we acknowledge the valuable and expert work done by 
government agencies such as the Australian Media and Communication Authority (ACMA) and the 
Office of Film and Literature Classification (OFLC). ACMA, in particular, has been exemplary in 
producing research to inform public policy. However, the historical record gives little room for public 
confidence in the level of resourcing for the role either agency is potentially being asked to play in the 
next iteration of public policy and regulation around online media content. 
 
The anomalies in the regulation of media in Australia are perhaps best illustrated by the current 
treatment of computer games which, while classifiable under the Classification (Publications, Films 
and Computer Games) Act 1995 remain unavailable for classification under the R 18+ or X18+ 
categories. This distinction is based, according to the Classification Guidelines, on the premise that 
the interactivity of games changes their impact on media audiences. This distinction is, from the point 
of view of a wide body of media studies research into gaming and other media consumption practices, 
unsustainably broad and certainly not supported by the empirical evidence in our field. As a research 
paper examining a major national study of computer gamers clearly demonstrates, the typical gamer 
is 30 years of age, often a parent and actively engaged in making decisions about what media is 
appropriate for themselves and their children (Brand et al, 2009). The question necessarily arises: 
why is such a consumer trusted to have access to R 18+ material in a cinema but be denied access to 
an R18+ video game they play on their computer?   
 
Much of the regulation of media content in Australia has evolved in a distinctly jerry built manner that 
has often taken little account of empirical evidence about public attitudes or of expert studies of how 
consumers actually interact with media. The treatment of X-rated material in Australia is another case 
in point. This category of sexually explicit and non-violent material was first proposed in 1983 at a 
meeting of Australian commonwealth and state ministers responsible for censorship. They agreed 
that a new X-rated classification was warranted to accommodate the new video market which allowed 
adults to view sexually explicit material in their own homes. The original classification clearly excluded 
sexually violent material, child pornography and bestiality. Under the new scheme, all excluded 
material was to be refused classification (RC) and deemed illegal to sell or rent. The agreed plan was 
for all the state Attorneys- General to pass mirror legislation, also passed in the ACT and NT, that 
brought this classification into law. The reality was very different. Following political pressure applied 
by interest groups, no states followed through on the agreement. The result is that this material is 
available in the ACT and in parts of the Northern Territory but still not legally available for sale or 
rental in any Australian state. The more insidious result is that there is now a substantial unregulated 
black market in not only X rated, but also RC material in all states. The ban on this material has been 
in place since the mid-1980s, despite a wealth of research showing that up to 90 % of Australians, in 
common with international studies, have no concern about adults accessing non-violent sexually 
explicit material (McKee, Albury, Lumby, 2009) 
 
The history of public policy and regulation around other media is not incidental to our focus in this 
report. The examples provided above demonstrate an issue germane to public policy issue: that the 
current system of classification and media content regulation has not been developed in an 
evidenced-based manner. It has historically treated various new media in a piecemeal fashion, been 
shaped by interest groups with scant reference to empirical evidence about what the majority of 
Australians think and want and by untested (though understandable) public fears about new media 
and new genres. From the consumer’s point of view, the current system of media content regulation 
4  
now resembles a bowl of spaghetti. There is a raft of different systems that work simultaneously, and 
with little coherence, in relation to consumer concerns. These systems range across self-regulation 
(advertising and much of news and current affairs reporting), variable and inconsistent levels of 
regulation (popular magazines, videos, computer games) and strict criminal regulation (child 
pornography, incitement to terrorist activities). How the content of different media is regulated and 
understood depends largely on what original medium the content arrived in, on what political 
pressures were extant at the time of regulation and on what political and public debates have 
subsequently arisen.  
 
In the relatively new but rapidly evolving online environment the disjuncture between these different 
and often contradictory regulatory systems are fracturing along numerous fault lines. As material from 
a wide variety of media- produced by professionals and amateurs – is increasingly published online, 
the issue of which original classification lens it should be seen through becomes increasingly vexed.  
 
A compelling example of this is the public debate that erupted over a photograph of a 12 year old 
female taken by internationally known artist Bill Henson. Henson has been exhibiting his photographs 
for three decades and a substantial portion include nude subjects who are in their early adolescence. 
65,000 people attended his retrospective exhibition hung in the Art Gallery of NSW in 2006. There 
was no attendant public outcry when his works were exhibited in a major gallery. In 2008, however, 
when the Roslyn Oxley gallery put the work in question on an invitation and it went up on the gallery’s 
website a small group of media commentators ignited a public furore. Bill Henson’s work was 
subsequently seized by police from the Oxley gallery and from public institutions, including the 
National Gallery of Australia. Many public commentators, including key politicians, denounced the 
work as a form of child pornography. ACMA was asked to classify Henson’s images, on the basis that 
they had been posted online. They then referred them to the OFLC. After two weeks of heated public 
debate, a panel of five classifiers determined that the images should be given the lowest classification 
rating: G. 
 
Despite the regulatory outcome, what the Henson affair alerts us to is the potential for the broad 
language of the current classification code and guidelines to be used to ignite public and political 
controversy. This is particularly the case under a mandatory rather than a voluntary filtering system. 
The diversity, intent and audience of online material multiplies this potential exponentially. The 
Henson affair was a case that clearly demonstrated how weeks of public furore, media attention and 
regulatory resources can be easily consumed by concerns about a small group of images or a body of 
text, understood as legal or innocuous elsewhere, if posted online. A much more pointed question that 
flows from this controversy is how well ACMA and the OFLC are prepared and resourced to deal with 
the innumerable controversies and challenges to online material that will potentially arise once filtering 
is mandatory and proceeds on the basis of a blacklist of content that, on the basis of the existing 
ACMA blacklist, will range across a broad variety of material. 
 
The online environment brings together an unprecedented range of media formats, platforms and 
technologies. It does so in a way that allows consumers, of all ages, to both produce and consume 
media. It allows them to access content via their computers and phones. It also confronts them, as 
citizens, parents and public policy advocates, with an unprecedented array of content to negotiate. 
Understanding the risks and opportunities of this new media environment, as we argue on the basis of 
research outlined below, involves understanding how this environment changes the way in which 
people produce and consume media. Just as video technology fundamentally changed the context 
and the autonomy with which people consume documentary and entertainment media, so the rise of 
the internet, and particularly the Web 2.0 environment, have had a radical impact on the agency of 
media consumers and on how they consume and understand the media content they live with on a 
daily basis. 
 
 
Online Media Content Regulation: Future Directions 
 
A neglected aspect of public policy that needs to be considered in the internet filtering debate is the 
question of how we sensibly balance the risks posed by online material, particularly to children, and 
the opportunities provided to the broader community to participate in sometimes controversial 
debates, to access and debate material pertaining to political and social issues, and to allow 
reasonable adults to make decisions about what they consume or produce online.  
 
The potential risks of an unregulated online environment to the public, and to children in particular, 
are real. In an Australian context, however, these debates have frequently run parallel to utopian 
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discussions of the educational and socially transformative potential of digital, online and mobile media 
without any recognition of how the two might relate. In thinking about how we frame online content 
regulation and public policy it is critical that we bring these two frames of reference into dialogue. Our 
understanding of risk must be balanced with an appreciation of the opportunities that this new media 
environment provides. 
 
There is now a substantial body of work available on the risks and opportunities that the internet 
poses and provides to young people, particularly that gathered by the extensive and expert EU Kids 
Online research network. This project examined key European research on cultural, contextual and 
risk issues in children's safe use of the internet and new media across 21 countries. This work, cited 
in the influential and recent UK Byron Review 3 clearly suggests that public policy and regulation 
which is genuinely and empirically grounded in an ethic of care for children and young people will fail 
if it relies too heavily on a simplistic block and control strategy. It also strongly suggests that getting 
the balance right between regulation and the education of parents and young people about safe 
internet use is critical when it comes to the overall effectiveness of a broader protection strategy4.  
 
Both the EU Kids Online research and the Byron Review found that many parents are simply unaware 
of the risks to their children and/or feel unable to supervise their internet use. One of the clear risks of 
focusing disproportionate public policy attention and public resources on content regulation is that 
many parents will gain a false sense of security when it comes to the material their children encounter 
online. This risk is particularly high in a regulatory system that relies on a blacklist that, by its very 
nature, will only capture and represent a small sample of the wealth of online material of concern. As 
Dr Tanya Byron argued when launching her report: “A useful way for us all to think about this is to 
look at how we protect children in places of benefit and risk in the real (offline) world: public swimming 
pools. Here there are safety signs and information; shallow as well as deep ends; swimming aids and 
lifeguards; doors, locks and alarms. However children will sometimes take risks and jump into waters 
too deep for them or want to climb walls and get through locked doors – therefore we also teach them 
how to swim. We must adopt the same combination of approaches in order to enable our children and 
young people to navigate these exciting digital waters while supporting and empowering them to do 
so safely”5.  
 
In broader terms, focusing too much public attention and government policy on filtering material 
detracts from the need to promote and propagate the use of the internet much more widely, for many 
new purposes, including education, science, journalism, imaginative work, health and community-
building. With the progressive roll-out of the National Broadband Network, public education is required 
on the use of the internet, not only on its dangers. The internet offers new opportunities for innovation, 
entrepreneurship and the growth of knowledge, and it extends these opportunities to the whole 
population.  
 
Public policy, arguably, needs to promote a clear element of personal responsibility for navigating the 
online environment, just as people have to take responsibility for walking down the street and driving 
a car. The priority should be to balance maximum access to information with necessary regulation. 
The ‘opportunity cost’ incurred by mandatory ISP filtering of content is that this move potentially puts 
in jeopardy the economic, cultural and social benefits of population-wide internet use (which is a 
government priority via NBN and the Education Revolution), by focusing public attention on control, 
prohibition, and danger.  
 
Young people, particularly those under 18, are accustomed to being told that their parents know best. 
To some extent the journey of adolescence is a conversation between parents and their maturing 
offspring about learning trust and respect for the other’s perspective, to the point where the children 
are themselves prepared to take on the responsibilities of adulthood and parenting. ABS research has 
repeatedly communicated the existence of this family-level negotiation around trust, autonomy and 
consequences when it comes to online access and activity, with negotiated changes in family rules as 
children mature. In the 2007 Australian study of 751 households, involving telephone interviews with 
parents and 1003 children of the households aged between 8-17 completing diaries, researchers 
found that:  “Most parents trust their child’s judgement about the internet and, at least some of the 
time, leave it up to him/her to choose what is done on the internet (83%). This includes two-thirds who 
trust their child’s judgement all/most of the time (66%).”6  
 
The Rudd government is committed to rolling out a national broadband network with world class 
speeds and capacity, with the aim of enhancing education, commerce and innovation. Applying a filter 
to an already slow system, prior to the NBN roll-out, will cripple it further. To apply the filter to the 
enhanced services available once the NBN is in place will reduce the benefit and increase the costs 
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of access necessarily excluding some from participation: arguably those who stand to benefit most. 
Coupled with the other reasons to rethink such a strategy, the NBN is an encouragement to regulators 
to see their role as an enabling one, and not as one which restricts and limits.       
 
2.0  The Scope of Filtered Content 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As part of their pre-election platform, and since their election in 2007, the Rudd government has 
sought to address public concerns over internet content by signalling an intention to expand the 
regulatory approach to internet censorship by implementing a mandatory internet filtering program. 
This program would compel Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block users from accessing websites 
deemed prohibited. 
 
The proposed internet filter was promised as part of the government’s election pledge regarding their 
Plan for Cyber Safety Policy, which also called for greater education, international cooperation, more 
research and additional law enforcement7. Concerning the planned internet filter, the Labor party’s 
pre-election factsheet specified that, if elected, the government would:  
 
“Provide a mandatory ‘clean feed’ internet service for all homes, schools and public 
computers that are used by Australian children. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will filter out 
content that is identified as prohibited by the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA). The ACMA ‘blacklist’ will be made more comprehensive to ensure that children are 
protected from harmful and inappropriate online material.8  
 
More specifically, in regards to the type of content that will be filtered, the factsheet states: 
“Labor’s ISP policy will prevent Australian children from accessing any content that has been 
identified as prohibited by ACMA, including sites such as those containing child pornography 
and X-rated material.9” 
 
In May 2008, the Government made good on its election promise and committed $125.8 million over 
four years to implement their proposed range of cyber safety measures10. According to the minister’s 
website, “The policy reflects the view that ISPs should take some responsibility for enabling the 
blocking of 'prohibited' material on the internet, as they do in a number of western, developed 
countries.11” Similarly, in regards to the type of content that the government intends to blacklist, the 
Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy has stated that ACMA will maintain 
a list of internet web sites, predominantly comprising images of the sexual abuse of children, which 
are defined as 'prohibited' under Australian legislation. 
 
2.2 Current Government Policy  
 
Understood broadly, the current federal government policy on cyber-safety acknowledges the 
importance of taking a comprehensive approach to the issue. The Minster responsible for Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, Senator Stephen Conroy, has been clear that “ISP filtering 
is no silver bullet” and stated that the government’s $125.8 million cyber-safety policy includes an 
emphasis on education and information measures along with law enforcement, consultation with 
industry and community stakeholders and conducting further research. The critical issue, and one that 
is yet to emerge in the detail of the policy roll out, is where the balance will ultimately lie in terms of 
resourcing and policy focus.  
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Australia lags well behind its US, and particularly its European counterparts, when it comes to any 
detailed and original research into how children, families and adult consumers interact with and 
experience online material. Despite recent Federal funding of research on these matters, there is, in 
relative terms, still a paucity of broad and rich research on which our Federal Government can draw in 
responding to the increasingly pressing issue of what kind of material Australians, including children, 
produce and share online and how to protect them from genuinely inappropriate and illegal material. 
As technology and platforms rapidly evolve, the list of questions about how to understand and 
regulate new kinds of material grows. In such an environment, it is to be expected that government 
policy on cybersafety needs to be flexible enough to reflect this uncertain and evolving landscape.  
 
In December 2009, Minister Conroy announced that the RC category would be used as a basis for 
mandatory filtering of the internet at ISP level in Australia. This submission addresses some public 
law and policy concerns about the efficacy of using that category as a basis for filtering. 
The current proposal indicates that the list of mandatorily filtered sites will be based on the RC 
category. The key issue that arises here is that the RC category – developed primarily as a 
classification code for film and video – is a broad category which invites broad legal and quasi-legal 
interpretation. 
 
 
2.3 The ACMA Blacklist  
 
In 2007, the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (BSA) was amended by the Communications Legislation 
Amendment (Content Services) Act. These changes, which came into effect in January 2008, 
significantly changed the face of online media content regulation in Australia. Working together, 
Schedule 5 of the BSA and a new Schedule 7 established a scheme to regulate internet content 
which is overseen by the Australian Communication and Media Authority.  
 
Under the current co-regulatory scheme, internet content in Australia is regulated by a complaints 
based schemed managed by ACMA. Their response to a complaint depends on two factors: how the 
content is classified and where it is hosted. If it is hosted in Australia and deemed to be "prohibited 
content" it is subject to a takedown notice issued to the content host or ISP hosting the content. If it is 
hosted offshore, however, ACMA notifies IIA’s Family Friendly filter providers accredited under its co-
regulatory industry codes. They must update their filters upon such notification. Under the IIA codes, 
ISPs do not have to block access to URLs. Instead they must make an accredited filter or filtered 
services available to users. It is up to the users if they wish to use such filters or adopt other means to 
supervise their children online. 
 
The mandatory filtering scheme proposed would remove this voluntary aspect of filtering in relation to 
content hosted offshore (the bulk of online material) and potentially result in a system where an 
extremely wide range of sites from MA 15+ material to RC material will be blocked.  
 
Schedule 5 of the Broadcasting Services Act establishes the mechanism for ACMA to deal with 
prohibited content of the internet that is hosted offshore: 
 
 
 
 
This Schedule sets up a system for regulating certain aspects of the Internet industry.  
If the ACMA is satisfied that Internet content hosted outside Australia is prohibited content or 
potential prohibited content, the ACMA must:  
(a)     if the ACMA considers that the content is of a sufficiently serious nature to warrant 
referral to a law enforcement agency--notify the content to an Australian police force;  
(b) notify the content to Internet service providers so that the providers can deal with the 
content in accordance with procedures specified in an industry code or industry standard (for 
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example, procedures for the filtering, by technical means, of such content).  
Bodies and associations that represent the Internet service provider section of the Internet 
industry may develop industry codes.  
The ACMA has a reserve power to make an industry standard if there are no industry codes or if 
an industry code is deficient.  
The ACMA may make online provider determinations regulating Internet service providers.  
 
 
If they believe that the content would be considered prohibited content if reviewed by the Classifications 
Board then ACMA would add it to the blacklist which is given to the filtering software providers.  
 
Schedule 7 relates to content hosted in Australia. It provides: 
 
 
A person may make a complaint to the ACMA about prohibited content, or potential prohibited 
content, in relation to certain services.  
The ACMA may take the following action to deal with prohibited content or potential prohibited 
content:  
(a)     in the case of a hosting service--issue a take-down notice;  
(b)     in the case of a live content service--issue a service-cessation notice;  
(c)     in the case of a links service--issue a link-deletion notice.  
Content (other than an eligible electronic publication) is prohibited content if:  
(a)     the content has been classified RC or X 18+ by the Classification Board; or 
(b)     the content has been classified R 18+ by the Classification Board and access to the        
content is not subject to a restricted access system; or  
(c)     the content has been classified MA 15+ by the Classification Board, access to the content is 
not subject to a restricted access system, the content does not consist of text and/or one or more 
still visual images, and the content is provided by a commercial service (other than a news 
service or a current affairs service); or  
 
(d)     the content has been classified MA 15+ by the Classification Board, access to the content is 
not subject to a restricted access system, and the content is provided by a mobile premium 
service.  
Content that consists of an eligible electronic publication is prohibited content if the content has 
been classified RC, category 2 restricted or category 1 restricted by the Classification Board.  
Generally, content is potential prohibited content if the content has not been classified by the 
Classification Board, but if it were to be classified, there is a substantial likelihood that the content 
would be prohibited content.  
Bodies and associations that represent sections of the content industry may develop industry 
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codes.  
The ACMA has a reserve power to make an industry standard if there are no industry codes or if 
an industry code is deficient.  
The ACMA may make determinations regulating certain content service providers and hosting 
service providers.  
 
 
Under existing legislation12, prohibited online content is any content that would be rated “RC” and 
“X18+” or rated R18+ or MA15+ (for commercial services) and not subject to a restricted access 
warning system.  
 
Refused Classification (“RC”) content is any content which depicts: 
 paedophilic activity 
 child abuse 
 instruction on drug use  
 instruction on how to commit a crime 
 bestiality 
 sexual nudity involved minors 
 excessive and frequent violence 
 sexual activity involving minors or descriptions of it 
 violence during sex 
 fetish activity 
 incest fantasies 
 exceeds lower classification categories 
 video games that exceed MA15+ 
 
X18+ Content is any content which depicts: 
 Actual sexual intercourse between consenting adults 
 The following is also strictly not permitted in this category: 
o No violence, sexual violence or coercion  
o Fisting   
o Candle wax 
o Bondage 
o Spanking 
o Golden showers  
o Depiction of people over 18 as minors 
 
R18+ permits simulated sex but not visual material that shows people having actual intercourse, 
including penetration and oral sex.  
In terms of the ACMA reviewers reaching a decision about the likelihood of material being prohibited 
content, Senator Conroy stated: 
 
ACMA content assessors have been members of the Classification Board and/or undergo 
formal training provided by the Classification Board. ACMA employs a number of former 
National Classification Board members within the Codes, Content and Education Branch who 
have a combined experience of close to 20 years at the Classification Board. This experience 
in conjunction with the formal training and regular referrals of content to the Classification 
Board help ensure consistency of classification decisions13. 
 
 
At the 30th of April 2009 there were 977 URLs on the ACMA blacklist14. Although the specific sites on 
the blacklist remain undisclosed, approximately 49% (479 URLs) of these websites were blocked on 
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the basis of an X18+, R18+ or MA15+ classification. Approximately 51% of the blocked sites were 
refused classification: 32% being for child depiction with the other 19% for unspecified other reasons. 
 
This figure of 977 URLs has decreased from “around 1,110 URLs” which was the figure quoted on 
January 31st 200915. Two of the blacklisted URLs contained images of dismembered foetuses. In the 
period 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008, ACMA notified 1206 URLs relating to prohibited content 
and potential prohibited content hosted outside Australia to the makers of filtering software. Over the 
same period, ACMA removed 1048 items that no longer provided access to prohibited content or 
potential prohibited content. In the period 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2007, 1812 were notified. 
The figures stated above include any duplicate notifications resulting from multiple complaints about a 
specific URL during the period.  
 
According to Senator Stephen Conroy16, as at 30 November 2008, of the URLs on the blacklist: 
 
          (i) 0 relate to Internet content which is or would be classified MA15+; 
          (ii) 65 relate to Internet content which is or would be classified R18+; 
          (iii) 441 relate to Internet content which is or would be classified X18+; 
          (iv) 864 relate to Internet content which is or would be refused classification (RC); 
          (v) 674 relate to Internet content which is or would be refused classification in accordance  
with paragraph 1(b) of the Films Table of the National Classification Code because it depicts 
in a way likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult a person who is (or appears to be) a 
child under 18. 
 
 
 
ACMA assessed and took action in relation to a further 778 items of overseas-hosted content, which 
were assessed as follows for the year ended 30 June 200817: 
 
   
Classification and description of online 
content 
Number of items 
MA 15+ – Violence 0 
MA 15+ – Sex 0 
MA 15+ – Themes 0 
MA 15+ – Drug Use 0 
MA 15+ – Nudity 0 
MA 15+ – Language 0 
R 18+ – Violence 0 
R 18+ – Sex 6 
R 18+ – Themes 0 
R 18+ – Drug Use 0 
R 18+ – Nudity 3 
R 18+ – Language 0 
X 18+ – Actual sexual activity 249 
RC – Crime – promotion/instruction 2 
RC – Violence – depiction 1 
RC – Paedophilia – promotion/instruction 3 
RC – Child – depiction 409 
RC – Bestiality – depiction 10 
RC – Sexual violence – depiction 13 
RC – Sexual fetish – depiction 42 
RC – Sexual fantasy – depiction 40 
RC – Drug use – promotion/instruction 0 
RC – Terrorist related material 0 
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RC – Publication 0 
Cat 1 – Publication 0 
Cat 2 – Publication 0 
 
 
2.4    Online content regulation: the treatment of X and RC material 
In order to determine whether content is permissible, ACMA relies on their interpretation of the 
censorship regulations as contained in the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) 
Act 1995 (Cth). Internet content is regulated through the same classification system used for films (not 
the more relaxed publications classification system). Section 9 of the Act states that “subject to 
section 9A, publications, films and computer games are to be classified in accordance with the Code 
and the classification guidelines.” The Code refers to the National Classification Code18 (see appendix 
three and four). The legislative scheme also includes Guidelines for the Classification of Films and 
Computer Games 2005. The Guidelines were made under s 12 of the Act which empowers the 
Minister, (that is, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth), with the agreement of participating 
State and Territory Ministers, to determine guidelines to assist the decision-maker in applying the 
criteria set out in the Code.19  
 
The recent broadening of what may be considered prohibited content under the current voluntary 
filtering system raises more questions than it answers about what kind and scope of material may 
disappear from our computer screens in the near future and how the Classification Act will work in 
relation to Schedules 5 and 7. There is certainly a very real risk that reasonable adults will be 
prohibited from viewing a very wide range of content and that some content, which is legal offline, 
may become illegal to access online. For example, X18+ material can be legally purchased in the 
ACT or bought by mail order and viewed on a home DVD player. Under the new prohibited content 
scheme and mandatory filtering it appears very likely that all Australia adults would be denied the right 
to watch legally classifiable material on the internet, regardless of whether such sites were restricted 
to viewers over the age of 18.  
 
The interpretation of the RC category, in particular, opens an array of potential issues given the 
breadth of the purpose and audience for online material. While the category is designed to refuse 
classification to material that the vast majority of Australians find abhorrent, including child 
pornography, bestiality and active incitement to acts of violence, there is also room to include material 
that sits in a much greyer area. The Classification Act does not detail criteria for determining what 
criteria should be applied in determining whether content is RC. Rather, it states that material be 
classified in accordance with the principles in the National Classification Code. These guidelines are 
extremely broad For example, in relation to publications, films and computer games one sections 
states that content will be RC if it deals with: sex, drug misuse, addiction, crime, cruelty, violence or 
revolting or abhorrent phenomena in such a way that they offend against the standards of morality, 
decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults to the extent that they should not be 
classified”. The term ‘reasonable adult’ could be understood as a means of limiting the range of 
material caught under the RC provision. A common sense reading would suggest that the views of the 
majority of Australians should be taken into account when determining whether a ‘reasonable adult’ 
would expect material to be refused classification. In practice, however, this has not been the case. 
 
In Adultshop.Com Ltd v Members of the Classification Review Board [2007] FCA 1871 the court 
considered the test of “likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult” provision in the Code. The case 
was brought by Adultshop.com Pty Ltd. who applied to have the court review the Classification 
Review Board’s decision to classify the sexually explicit film, Viva Erotica, as X18+. Although R18+ 
and X18+ are both restricted to persons above the age of 18, the effect of an X18+ rating means that 
the film cannot be legally sold or rented in Australia, other than in the Australian Capital Territory or 
the Northern Territory. In their original appeal to the Classification Review Board, Adultshop.Com had 
provided extensive expert witness material demonstrating that the great majority of Australians were 
not opposed to people over the age of 18 accessing non-violent sexually explicit films.  
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In bringing their suit against the Classification Review Board, the applicants contended that (1) the 
Guidelines are beyond the power of the Minister under s 12 of the Act because they dictate an X18+ 
classification without regard to “the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted 
by reasonable adults” or the provisions of the Code; (2) if the Guidelines are valid, the Review Board 
applied them without regard to the merits of the case; (3) that the Review Board failed to give effect to 
a proper construction of the phrase “likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult”; (4) the Review 
Board’s approach to the task led it to wrongly reject or discount certain survey and expert evidence 
called by Adultshop in support of its claim for an R18+ classification; and (5) Adultshop pointed to a 
finding made by the Review Board that there was extensive community consultation in the process of 
updating the Guidelines in 2005. Adultshop contended that the 2005 review of the Guidelines did not 
consider the X18+ classification and there was no community consultation on that issue.   
 
In rendering their verdict, the court ruled that a reasonable adult was not a mechanistic test, nor was it 
to be applied in a majoritarian sense but rather as a collective interpretation of what society 
considered inappropriate or likely to cause offense. Because relevant legislation specifies that the 
Classification Board and the Classification Review Board are to be composed of a cross section of 
Australian society, the court ruled that the board’s judgement as to the likelihood of certain content to 
cause offense is sufficient. In short, evidence about the views of what a large majority of adults think 
other adults should be allowed to see, read or watch is not taken directly into account in the current 
classification system. The OFLC, unlike its UK counterpart, has not conducted broad empirical 
research into community attitudes and the interpretation of the guidelines is de facto left to a small 
group of people who are said to represent and understand who the ‘reasonable man’.  
 
Another area, which deserves scrutiny in relation to material that is potentially caught under RC 
guidelines online, is the clause in the Code referring to materials that “promote, incite or instruct in 
matters of crime and violence”. The classification guidelines were challenged in this regard in the 
NSW Council for Civil Liberties Inc v Classification Review Board (No. 2) [2007] FCA 89620. In this 
case, two publications, Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands were assessed as ‘RC’ 
(Refused Classification) by the Classification Review Board. The grounds upon which the applicant 
claimed relief depended upon what it contended was the Review Board’s erroneous application of the 
provisions of the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth). In 
particular, the applicant took issue with the Review Board’s decision to classify the publications ‘RC’ 
on the basis of its finding that both publications ‘promoted, incited or instructed in matters of crime or 
violence’. 
 
The NSW Council for Civil Liberties Inc challenged the Classification Review Board’s decision on four 
key points: (1) the meaning of the clause “promote, incite or instruct in matters of crime or violence” 
(2) that violence only refers to violence in Australia (3) that the review board failed to consider the 
elements of Section 101 of the Criminal Code and (4) the failure of the review board to consider the 
educational merits of the books.  
The court found that in order to be refused classification under the Act, it is not necessary for a 
publication to solely stimulate or increase the likelihood for the recipient to commit violence, but that it 
should also be considered against the other provisions of the section of the Act which include “in such 
a way that the contents of the publication offend against the standards of morality, decency” and “... in 
a way that it is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult.” The judge also reasoned that “the 
publications ‘may appeal to some disenfranchised segments of the community’ and that ‘the book was 
designed to encourage such people to take up arms and commit specific crimes against non-
believers’” and that this was in fact “addressed to the audience, in Australia, to which the instructions 
and exhortations in the publications might appeal.”  
The Rabelais case21 (Michael Brown & Ors v Members of the Classification Review Board of the 
Office of Film and Literature [1998] FCA 319) tested the “instruct in matters of crime” of the National 
Classification Code made under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 
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1995 (Cth). The facts of the case pertained to the July 1995 edition of "Rabelais", the student 
newspaper of the La Trobe University Student Representative Council. The edition contained an 
article called "The Art of Shoplifting". Following complaints from retailers the article was found by the 
Commonwealth Office of Film and Literature to "instruct in matters of crime" and was subsequently 
refused classification thus prohibiting its distribution. In rendering its decision, the review Board 
considered what it described as "the content, theme and tone of the publication". It found the tone of 
the article to be instructional and hortatory. While it was claimed that the writing was not without 
humour, it lacked indicators that it was intended to be satirical. Its tone was considered to border on 
malicious. A majority of the Board concluded that the publication instructed in matters of crime and 
should be refused classification. A minority of the Board was of the opinion that “while the article was 
instructional in shoplifting the context of the publication with the nature of the crime was such that the 
publication should not be refused classification". 
In their ruling, the three presiding justices concurred with the review board’s decision arguing that the 
assessment of whether a publication instructs in matters of crime must be read as whole and in 
context including the authors, the publication itself and the intended target readership. Only when the 
writing is of satirical or ironic character such that it negates the instruction by conveying the message 
that this is not to be taken seriously can it be found to be not in breach of the law. In this instance the 
court found that the language of the article did not convey such negation and that the review board 
had diligently followed the provisions of the Act in rendering its decision to refuse classification.  
The cases referred to above strongly suggest that interpretations of what is deemed part of the 
extraordinarily catch-all RC category is one the courts are inclined to leave to the discretion of the 
Classification Board and Review Board. This is of real concern for an online environment in which the 
range, scope and purpose of material is far wider than even that encountered in films produced for 
entertainment purposes. Adding weight to this concern is that one of the factors that the Classification 
Act states must be taken into account when classifying material is “the persons or class of persons to 
or amongst whom it is published or intended or likely to be published”. This provision reflects a set of 
assumptions about material is generated and consumed which map onto the traditional media 
environment but which become almost meaningless in an era where material migrates rapidly across 
many contexts and where an enormous amount of content is generated by consumers themselves. 
It is useful, at this point, to consider some hypothetical examples of material that could well be 
deemed RC and mandatorily filtered out of the Australian internet. Potential material that could 
feasibly be deemed RC on the basis of the current Classification Code includes: 
 A site devoted to debating the merits of euthanasia in which some participants exchanged 
information about actual euthanasia practices. 
 A site set up by a community organisation to promote harm minimisation in recreational drug 
use. 
 A site designed to give a safe space for young gay and lesbians to meet and discuss their 
sexuality in which some members of the community narrated explicit sexual experiences. 
 An art gallery website which includes photographs of naked children or adolescents taken by 
an established artist. 
 A site discussing the causes of terrorism that published material exemplifying the beliefs of a 
terrorist organisation in order to ground the discussion of the causes of terrorism. 
 A website in which survivors of child sexual abuse shared their experiences in a therapeutic 
context 
 The online publication of a university newspaper which include an article about smoking 
marijuana 
It is important not to be alarmist about the scope of material that will be caught under the RC or X18+ 
categories should mandatory filtering go ahead. It should certainly be noted that the Classification 
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Code clearly states classification decisions should give effect to the principle that “adults should be 
able to read, hear and see what they want”. How this injunction will be interpreted in relation to online 
material under a mandatory system, however, is open to broad interpretation. 
 
2.5     Transparency and the right of appeal and judicial review 
 
While it is clear that the government’s stated intention is the adoption of a mandatory internet filter to 
prevent access to prohibited content, it is unclear exactly how the mechanisms for this will be 
implemented. While preventing access to child pornography is clearly one of the primary reasons for 
implementing this filter, the current ACMA blacklist suggests that majority of websites (61%) on the 
blacklist fall outside this category of material. 
 
A further critical concern is that, under the present system, the ACMA blacklist is not released for 
public comment and, while those hosting content which is put on the list have a right of appeal, 
content creators or other people who could be deemed to have standing in the matter, have no right 
of appeal. Without a right of appeal under public administrative law, there is also no avenue of judicial 
review. While there are well established precedents for exemption from administrative appeal – for 
instance if matters pertaining to national security or the broad protection of public morality – the 
offence to established democratic practice arguably increases exponentially in relation to the scope of 
content being filtered. Given the breadth of material that exists online and is potentially caught by the 
prohibited content provisions it seems to us, imperative, that at the very least the Federal Government 
commits to a clear system of appeal and judicial review of decisions and that there is transparency 
about what is put onto such a blacklist with rare exceptions.   
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3.0 The International Practice of Internet Filtering 
 
3.1  Europe 
The practice of internet filtering does occur in Europe; however, the vast majority of European filtering 
is voluntary. Internet service providers (ISPs), search engines and content providers engage in 
voluntary filtering on the understanding that by cooperating with the state, they can prevent further 
regulation in the future. Overall, ISPs are under no obligation to monitor the acceptability of internet 
content, but must filter unacceptable content once it is brought to their attention by the government, 
police, advocacy groups or the general public. In this way, the overwhelming majority of EU nations 
achieve the aim of blocking access to child pornography sites without resorting to legislation that their 
parliaments and peoples find coercive and objectionable. For most jurisdictions, it is illegal to possess 
or circulate child pornography (although the definition of ‘child’ varies, as does the age of consent). 
 
Over the past few years, however, there has been a discernable move towards greater regulation 
among EU countries, with a particular focus upon child pornography websites. As discussed below, in 
June 2009 Germany legislated to filter such websites in the face of considerable opposition and 
controversy and having given firm guarantees that the filtering regime only applies to child 
pornography. In the subsequent general election, the ruling Christian Democrat Party lost power and 
the laws have not yet been implemented. This leaves Italy as the only EU country using mandatory 
filtering. Here, the Italian government filtered some online gambling websites whose operations are 
illegal, before subsequently mandating the filtering of online child pornography, and an on/off 
prohibition of The Pirate Bay peer-to-peer BitTorrent site. Overall, however, there is no wholesale 
mandatory filtering of internet content in any EU country as is proposed for Australia, and EU 
countries have adopted voluntary filtering regimes prior to any consideration of mandated filtering. 
 
In terms of broader EU regulations, there is a general sentiment that voluntary ISP, search engine 
and content filtering should be preferred on the implicit understanding that it is through such voluntary 
cooperation with state authorities that further legislation will be unnecessary. The type of content 
filtered voluntarily relates to child pornography, racism, terrorism and sometimes gambling, as well as 
defamation. There is no obligation which requires ISPs to monitor internet traffic and they are largely 
protected from prosecution.  
 
The regional policy is specified in the Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC22. In Article 12, the 
“mere conduct” exception prevents ISPs from being prosecuted for information ‘merely’ transmitted 
over their networks with the proviso that they (1) did not initiate the message (2) they did not select or 
modify the information and or (3) they did not select the intended recipient. Article 14 addresses 
liability of ISPs for hosting content – “ISPs will not be liable for hosting information, provided they do 
not have actual knowledge that the activity is illegal and, upon obtaining such knowledge, act quickly 
to remove it.” Article 15 precludes ISPs from any general obligation to monitor content or data 
transmission on their servers23. 
 
In 1996, the European Council requested that the European Commission produce a “summary of the 
problems posed by the rapid development of the internet.” The commission produced a report entitled 
“Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet.24” This was followed by the drafting of a common 
framework for self regulation resulting in an Action Plan on Promoting Safe Use of the Internet25. The 
plan endorsed five major strategies to combat illegal and harmful content on the Internet: 
 
 Promoting voluntary industry self-regulation and content monitoring schemes, including the 
use of hotlines for the public to report illegal or harmful content. 
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 Providing filtering tools and rating systems that enable parents or teachers to regulate the 
access of Internet content by children in their care, while allowing adults to access legal 
content. 
 Raising awareness among consumers about services offered by industry to allow users to 
leverage the internet more fully. 
 Exploring the legal implications of promoting the safer use of the internet 
 Encouraging international cooperation in the area of regulation. 
 
Overall, in the EU, the filtering regime requires interaction between governments, police, advocacy 
groups and the general public who identify instances of undesirable content, and the ISPs who 
voluntarily filter such content on the understanding that any failure to do so is likely to result in greater 
regulation of the sector. The definition of undesirable content tends to vary between countries but is 
broadly classified as content which is either illegal or harmful. There is general consensus on what is 
considered illegal or harmful and this includes: child pornography, human trafficking, racist material, 
material promoting terrorism and all forms of internet fraud. Harmful material is material that might 
offend the values and sentiments of others and could pertain to politics, religion or racial matters. In 
the countries that have moved to legislate some mandatory filtering, Germany and Italy, assurances 
were given that the mandated filtering is narrowly defined (see below).  
 
3.1.1   Great Britain 
Large scale voluntary internet filtering was spearheaded by the United Kingdom whose Cleanfeed 
program was launched in June 2004 through a commitment by BT, Britain’s largest ISP. The program 
revolves around the filtering of content deemed inappropriate by its inclusion on a list of websites 
compiled by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF). The IWF is a not-for-profit organisation that runs in 
collaboration with government, industry, the police and the public. The program is largely orientated 
towards the filtering of images of child abuse as established in the UK’s Protection of Children Act 
1978. ISPs, mobile network operators, content providers and search engines such as Google and 
Yahoo are provided with a copy of the list and are encouraged to remove access to websites listed on 
it. Those who attempt to access illegal content hosted overseas encounter an error message. For 
content hosted in the UK, the offending material is required to be taken down. Additional internet 
surveillance is conducted by the UK’s Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. The law also 
enables police to forward the personal details of people who have accessed illegal content to banks, 
who will cancel their credit cards as a breach of service. 
 
3.1.2    Germany 
In June 2009, ignoring widespread opposition, the German parliament passed legislation to require 
ISPs to filter websites that contain child pornography. The secret filtering list was to be compiled by the 
German Federal Police and transmitted to ISPs daily, with a committee to monitor and check the list of 
banned sites26. In response to concerns that the filtering infrastructure could be used to block content 
such as online gambling, copyright violations and so on, Martina Krogmann, a government 
spokesperson and supporter of the legislation stated that “she is clearly opposed to a broadening of 
the scope, adding that the new law had been defined narrowly27”. In September 2009, before the 
legislation could be implemented, the Christian Democrats lost power in a General Election and were 
required to enter into coalition with the Free Liberals to remain in government. As part of the 
negotiations it was agreed not to implement the legislation but instead to embark upon a year’s trial of 
deleting websites hosting child abuse material, rather than blocking them28. 
 
17  
3.1.3    Italy 
During 2006 Italian ISPs were forced to block access to Web sites that offer online gambling by virtue of 
Financial Law (Law 266/2005). This gave the Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (AAMS 
or Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies, a part of the Ministry of Economy and Finances) the 
power to bring to the attention of ISPs instances in which gambling sites are operating without 
authorization from the AAMS itself. When brought to their attention by the AAMS, ISPs have the legal 
obligation to inhibit access to these sites by adopting appropriate technical measures to this end. The 
AAMS has compiled a list of websites that should not be accessed from Italian networks. This was list 
was implemented by ISPs through "hijacking" DNS communication and redirecting it to the DNS server 
of the AAMS. Users trying to access blocked websites were provided with a notice saying "pursuant to 
the decree of the AAMS of 7 February 2006 the requested website is not accessible because it does not 
have the necessary authorizations for collecting bets in Italy". The system, however, is easily 
circumvented by using a proxy server. Nevertheless, although technically avoidable, the blacklist is 
apparently still applied by Italian ISPs29. In January 2007 the Italian government passed a decree 
requiring ISPs to block access to child pornography websites after being notified of such websites by 
the National Centre against Child Pornography30. In 2008, using commercial law, an Italian court 
ordered ISPs to block access to Swedish BitTorrent site The Pirate Bay which facilitates the illegal 
exchange of copyright material. Successfully overturned on appeal, the original ruling was upheld by the 
Italian Supreme Court and the situation is still in flux.      
 
3.1.4   Sweden and Norway 
The Norwegian government has considered blocking access to “foreign gambling, websites that 
desecrate the flag or coat of arms of a foreign nation, that promote hatred towards public 
authorities, contain hate speech or promote racism, offensive pornography sites, and peer-to-peer 
sites that offer illegal downloads of music, movies or television shows.31” However, this proposal 
was not adopted by the government.  
 
A filtering system was announced in 2004 as collaboration between Telenor, the leading 
Scandinavian telecom company and KRIPOS, the Norwegian National Criminal Investigation 
Service. This system was designed to prevent access to child pornography at ISP level. The 
blacklisted URLs were based on a list compiled by KRIPOS. In May 2005, Telenor and the Swedish 
National Criminal Investigation Department announced that a similar filtering system had been 
introduced for all Telenor’s customers in Sweden32. 
 
Overall, however, in both Sweden and Norway, filtering occurs on a voluntary basis with no sanction 
for noncompliance. Each ISP determines the scope of blocking access33.  
 
 
3.1.5    Ireland 
Irish ISPs generally self-regulate in regards to child protection. When illegal content is identified, ISPs 
must take reasonable measures to remove that content from public access. ISPs are only required to 
respond to illegal content by removing illegal content hosted on their systems34.  
 
3.1.6   Denmark and Finland 
Since 2005, Finland has maintained a voluntary program to restrict access to child pornography 
websites. The Finnish police maintain a list of sites; however, there is no obligation for ISPs to block 
these sites. The same voluntary ISP-end filtering program is implemented by Denmark35. 
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3.2   United States and Canada36 
The application of internet filtering regulations differs in both Canada and the United States. Neither 
Canada nor the United States adopts a mandatory internet filtering system; nevertheless, regulation 
exists in both countries that revolves around four key issues: child-protection and morality, national 
security and computer security.  
 
In the US, the government has tried several times to legislate child protection; however, government 
mandated attempts have been struck down by the courts on the grounds of the First Amendment, 
regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The first piece of legislation was the United 
States Communication Decency Act (CDA). The provisions of this Act were to “criminalise the 
transmission of indecent material to persons under eighteen and the display to minors of patently 
offensive content and communications.” Civil libertarians challenged this law with the court finding that 
the bill’s uses of “indecent” and “patently offensive” were so vague that enforcement would have 
violated the First Amendment. This was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Following this defeat, a 
second piece of legislation was introduced - which became known as the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA). This legislation was directed at material considered “harmful to minors.” Again, however, the 
courts enjoined this legislation on first amendment grounds for the reason that to accurate identify 
“indecent” material and pre-emptively block it, would have required ISPs to filter arbitrarily and 
extensively in order to avoid criminal liability. In 2000, The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) 
was passed requiring public schools and libraries to implement Internet filtering technology in order to 
receive federal E-Rate funding. The law required that in order for a school or library to receive federal 
funds for internet access they must demonstrate to the FCC that it has installed or will install filtering 
technology. The technology must filter content that is deemed to be obscene, child pornography, or 
material harmful to minors. The choice as to which content fulfils this criteria is at the discretion of 
filtering technology developers who make such choices during the development phases of the 
technology. The law has been upheld by the Supreme Court following challenges on first amendment 
grounds.  
 
Overall, internet filtering in the United States is largely left to private manufacturers that compete for 
market share in internet filtering technologies. Those required to block content, such as schools and 
libraries, can select from a range of different filters each with different approaches. Some include 
whitelists of pre-approved sites whereas the majority use blacklists which are generated through 
automated screenings of the web. The decision as to what to filter rests in the purview of the filter 
manufacturers in the first instance, and then the individual PC users who implement that filtering 
software.  
 
Canadian practice in relation to internet filtering is orientated towards government facilitated industry 
self-regulation. Private parties are required to self-regulate with the encouragement of the government 
under the threat of future legislation or potential legal action. The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 
2001 made it a crime to access and distribute child pornography online. However, the law includes a 
proviso that ISPs are not required to assess the legality of content or to take action unless there is a 
judicial determination as to the legality of the content. Even so, the law does require that ISPs must 
provide all information required regardless of its content in return for immunity over the nature of its 
content. Therefore, ISPs cannot choose which information to pass on to law enforcement officers and 
which information to restrict access to.  Section 36 of the Canadian Telecommunications Act indicates 
that without the approval of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC), a Canadian carrier “shall not control the content or influence the meaning or purpose of 
telecommunications carried by it to the public37.”  
 
In November 2006, Canada launched Project Cleanfeed, a voluntary collaboration between Bell, Bell 
Aliant, MTS Allstream, Rogers, Shaw, SaskTel, Telus, and Vidéotron Canada38. Although the 
government was not directly involved, they did indicate their approval. The processes involved in 
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Project Cleanfeed are as follows: A member of the public or an authority notifies assessors when 
questionable images or content are found online. Two analysts assess that content and decide either 
to reject or approve it. If the site is to become listed, the URL is added to the Cleanfeed distribution list 
which is sent out to all ISPs who have agreed to voluntarily block sites on the list. This also prevents 
the ISPs from having to evaluate the URLs themselves, which would be considered illegal. ISPs will 
only block specific URLs and not a generic IP address to prevent overblocking, since overblocking 
could be illegal under the Telecommunications Act. Additionally, given that accessing child 
pornography is illegal in Canada it does not infringe on the right of access or free speech under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Similarly, however, it is also illegal to publish the list of 
blocked sites because it is considered illegal to provide access to child pornography. These different 
considerations raise a number of controversial issues for project Cleanfeed such as:  (1) it has not 
received authorisation from CRTC (2) the list needs to be keep undisclosed (3) the procedure for 
appealing the blocking of a site may have implications for anonymity. 
 
 
3.3   New Zealand 
Overall, New Zealand’s implementation of internet filtering is much less onerous than that proposed 
for Australia. New Zealand law does define offensive content, which includes hate speech, and such 
content can be investigated by the Department of Internal Affairs. Upon investigation, the Department 
of Internal Affairs submits non-classified material to the Office of Film and Literature Classification for 
a ruling. However, unlike in Australia, there is no explicated mechanism under which the government 
can issue a takedown notice. The New Zealand system relies instead on a classification system and 
while there is no direct online regulation of content, officials agree that the Films, Videos and 
Publications Act (1993) applies equally to objectionable online material. New Zealand law defines 
objectionable material as any material that “describes, depicts, expresses or otherwise deals with 
matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the 
publication is likely to be injurious to the public good.” More specifically, any material that promotes 
“the exploitation of children, or young persons or both, for sexual purposes; or the use of violence or 
coercion to compel any person to participate in, or submit to, sexual conduct, or sexual conduct with 
or upon the body of a dead person; or the use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or 
dehumanising conduct or sexual conduct, or bestiality, or acts of torture or the infliction of extreme 
violence or extreme cruelty” is considered to be objectionable.  
 
In July 2009, the New Zealand government’s Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) announced that they 
would be introducing software for voluntary use by ISPs which would form the basis of ‘The Digital 
Child Exploitation Filtering System.’ The software is explicitly restricted to blocking sites which provide 
access to child sexual abuse images. An independent committee is to oversee the operation of the 
filter and anyone who believes a site may be wrongly blocked can request a review of the filter. Keith 
Manch, Deputy Secretary of the Department, commented that “Joining the filtering programme is 
voluntary and if any ISP subsequently is unhappy it will be able to withdraw. This is another way of 
ensuring that the Department gets the filter right.”39 There is some indication that ISPs servicing over 
90% of NZ’s internet market are willing to adopt the system.40 A period of public consultation closed 
in September and the New Zealand government’s intentions regarding the system are spelled out in 
terms of services provided by the DIA.41 It is anticipated that the System will be operational early in 
2010. 
 
 
3.4     Reporters Without Borders 
Reporters Without Borders (RWB) provides a list of countries that they consider to be enemies of the 
internet42. Enemies of the internet are those countries which “prevent[ed] Internet users from 
obtaining news seen as ‘undesirable’. All of these countries mark themselves out not just for their 
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capacity to censor news and information online but also for their almost systematic repression of 
Internet users.43” This list comprises twelve countries44: 
 Burma 
 China 
 Cuba 
 Egypt 
 Iran 
 North Korea 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Syria 
 Tunisia 
 Turkmenistan 
 Uzbekistan; and 
 Vietnam 
The report on enemies of the internet also includes a further eleven countries which RWB considers 
to be “under surveillance.” Countries under surveillance are considered by RWB to “alternate between 
censorship and harassment of Internet users.” Australia is the only western nation included in this list 
of countries, on the grounds of its intention to “force all service providers to filter private Internet 
connections in each home to remove all ‘inappropriate’ content”.  The list comprises: 
 Australia 
 Bahrain 
 Belarus 
 Eritrea 
 Malaysia 
 South Korea 
 Sri Lanka 
 Thailand 
 United Arab Emirates 
 Yemen 
 Zimbabwe 
 
 
3.5 Open Net Initiative (ONI) Study of Countries with Pervasive or   
Substantial Filtering 
ONI is a global collaboration of four leading universities to monitor freedom on the Net. It is supported 
by Harvard, Toronto, Cambridge and Oxford Universities and researches and reports on a country by 
country and regional basis. While some western countries engage in selective filtering of certain types 
of content, usually within a cooperative and voluntary framework, a number of countries worldwide 
enforce more widespread forms of internet filtering. The following table45 indicates how countries 
engaged in pervasive or substantial censorship implement such internet censorship, for example 
through centralised control of the internet backbone, or decentralised ISP level filtering. The level of 
consistency of the filtering efforts is also noted, as is whether the government conceals that it is 
filtering content, and the level of government transparency and accountability. If the proposed 
Australian ISP-level filter were to be implemented then it would be appropriate for Australia to occupy 
a place on this table as indicated. (In the absence of a mandatory filter, Australia is not currently 
included in this table). Regarding a possible Australian entry, a ‘D’ in the first column indicates that the 
filtering occurs at the level of the ISP. The second column indicates that there will be consistency 
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across users since all ISPs will be required to filter up to 10,000 named sites. Australians do not yet 
know whether users attempting to access a blocked site will be told that the site is blocked but it is 
clear that the introduction of a filtering regime will be acknowledged publicly. Also evident, from the 
regulations regarding the ACMA blacklist, is that the specific details of prohibited sites will be kept 
secret and thus beyond public scrutiny and debate. 
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 Locus Consistency Concealed 
Filtering 
Transparency 
and 
Accountability 
Australia* D High No High 
Azerbaijan D Low No Medium 
Bahrain C High Yes Low 
China C and D Medium Yes Low 
Ethiopia C High Yes Low 
India D Medium No High 
Iran D Medium No Medium 
Jordan D High No Low 
Libya C High Yes Low 
Morocco C High Yes Low 
Myanmar D Low No Medium 
Oman C High No High 
Pakistan C and D Medium Yes High 
Saudi Arabia C High No High 
Singapore D High No High 
South Korea D High No High 
Sudan C High No High 
Syria D High No Medium 
Tajikistan D Low No Medium 
Thailand D Medium No Medium 
Tunisia C High Yes Low 
United Arab 
Emirates 
D Low No Medium 
Uzbekistan C and D High Yes Low 
Vietnam D Low Yes Low 
Yemen D High No Medium 
*Australia is not currently included in this list. This inclusion here indicates how Australia’s 
filtering regime is likely to be categorised were the proposed mandatory filter to be introduced. 
Locus: C = centralised (internet backbone), D = decentralised (implemented by ISPs) 
Consistency = the variation in filtering across different ISPs where applicable 
Concealed Filtering = efforts to conceal the fact that filtering is occurring or the failure to 
clearly indicate when it occurs 
Transparency and accountability = overall level of openness in regards to the practice of 
filtering. 
 
Similarly, the table below46 breaks into categories the type of internet censorship that countries 
actively pursue in terms of whether the material affected constitutes political censorship, social 
censorship, conflict and security censorship or the censorship of internet tools. According to the ONI, 
political censorship includes content that expresses views in opposition to those of the current 
government, or is related to human rights, freedom of expression, minority rights, and religious 
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movements47. Social content is content related to sexuality, gambling, and illegal drugs and alcohol, 
as well as other topics that may be socially sensitive or perceived as offensive48. Conflict and security 
content refers to armed conflicts, border disputes, separatist movements, and militant groups49. 
Internet tools refers to web sites that provide e-mail, Internet hosting, search, translation, Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephone service, and circumvention methods50.  
 
 Political Social Conflict and 
Security 
Internet Tools 
Australia* • • - - 
Azerbaijan • - - - 
Bahrain •• • - • 
Belarus Ο ο - - 
China ••• •• ••• •• 
Ethiopia •• • • • 
India - - • • 
Iran ••• ••• •• ••• 
Jordan • - - - 
Kazakhstan Ο - - - 
Libya •• - - - 
Morocco - - • • 
Myanmar ••• •• •• •• 
Oman - ••• - •• 
Pakistan • •• ••• • 
Saudi Arabia •• ••• • •• 
Singapore - • - - 
South Korea - • ••• - 
Sudan - ••• - •• 
Syria ••• • • •• 
Tajikistan • - - - 
Thailand • •• - • 
Tunisia ••• ••• • •• 
United Arab 
Emirates 
••* ••• • •• 
Uzbekistan •• • - • 
Vietnam ••• • - •• 
Yemen ••* ••• • •• 
  
*Australia is not currently included in this list. This inclusion here indicates how Australia’s filtering 
regime is likely to be categorised were the proposed mandatory filter to be introduced 
 
•••  Pervasive Filtering 
••  Substantial Filtering 
 •  Selective Filtering 
             o           Suspected Filtering      
 -  No evidence of Filtering 
 * According to website: http://opennet.net/research/profiles/ 
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Given the way in which Australia treats radical Muslim materials it might earn • ‘selective filtering’ for 
Political material. Similarly, the way Australia proposes to filter legal but restricted content and 
materials such as those provided by Exit Australia, the voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide 
society, indicates that the Social category might also become • ‘selective filtering’. According to the 
definitions above, there is little evidence of ‘conflict and security’ filtering other than that already 
identified in the ‘political’ category, while there is also little evidence currently of the blocking of 
internet tools. Such practices may emerge, however, when patches are created to circumnavigate the 
ISP-level filters. 
 
Even at the level of ‘selective filtering’, such a practice could place Australia in the uncomfortable 
company of some comparatively restrictive regimes. The list created comes from a table in the ONI 
book ‘Denied Access’ (2008), with ratings checked against the current website51. This indicates that 
UAE52 and Yemen53 may have moved from being classified as selective filterers of political content of 
the internet to nations that use substantial filtering. According to the combination of the book and the 
website, countries that operate selective filtering of political content comprise: Azerbaijan, Jordan, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan and Thailand. Those that practice selective filtering of social content are: Bahrain, 
Ethiopia, Singapore, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.  
 
With regards to the specific countries that operative selective filtering of political content, the Open 
Net Initiative comments: 
 
Azerbijan: “Azeri law does not require mandatory filtering or monitoring of Internet content … 
Anecdotal accounts claim that filtering of specific Web sites occurs, which is seemingly the result of 
informal requests to ISP managers by state officials from the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technologies, or the Presidency. These instances have been 
infrequent, and the resulting public outcry has led to a swift unblocking of the affected sites.”54 
 
Jordan: “ONI conducted in-country tests in Jordan on four ISPs: Jordan Telecom, Batelco, Orange, 
and Linkdotnet. Only arabtimes.com, a U.S.-based online newspaper often critical of Arab leaders, 
was found to be blocked.”55 
 
Pakistan:  “Currently Pakistanis have unimpeded access to most sexual, political, social, and 
religious content. However, the Pakistani government continues to use repressive measures against 
antimilitary, Balochi, and Sindhi political dissidents, and it blocks Web sites highlighting this 
repression. The government also filters high-risk antistate materials and blasphemous content.”56 
 
Tajikistan: “Tajikistan does not have an official policy on Internet filtering. However, state authorities 
have been known to restrict access to some Web sites at politically sensitive times by communicating 
their “recommendations” to all top-level ISPs.”57 
 
Thailand: “ONI conducted testing after the [Thai] coup on three major ISPs: KSC, LoxInfo, and True. 
Of the sites tested, only a small percentage was actually blocked. The Thai government does 
implement filtering and primarily blocks access to pornography, online gambling sites, and 
circumvention tools. Outside these categories, only a few sites were blocked by all three ISPs.” 58  
 
If a country such as Australia were to operate a mandatory filter at the level of the ISP, with a capacity 
to block up to 10,000 sites, with a secret blacklist less than 1/3 of which is child pornography (30 April 
2009)59, but which includes political/extremist publications such as Join the Caravan and Defence of 
the Muslim Lands among the materials refused classification, it might quite possibly find itself 
classified alongside the countries listed, judged as engaged in selective filtering of political content. 
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A similar picture emerges when considering countries that engage in selective filtering of social 
content. It should be noted here that while Bahrain was categorised in print as a selective filterer of 
social content, it is deemed on the ONI website to use ‘pervasive filtering’60. Countries classified in 
both print and on the web as selective filterers of social content are: Ethiopia, Singapore, South 
Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The ONI website offers specific country comments: 
 
Ethiopia: “Ethiopia’s current approach to filtering can be somewhat spotty, with the exception of the 
blanket block on two major blog hosts … ONI conducted testing on Ethiopia’s sole ISP, the ETC, in 
2008 and 2009. The ETC’s blocking efforts appear to focus on independent media, blogs, and political 
reform and human rights sites, though the filtering is not very thorough.”61 
 
Singapore: “The government of the Republic of Singapore engages in minimal Internet filtering, 
blocking only a small set of pornographic Web sites as a symbol of disapproval of their contents.”62 
 
South Korea: “ISPs have become increasingly responsible for policing content on their networks. In 
2001, the state promulgated the ‘Internet Content Filtering Ordinance’, reportedly requiring ISPs to 
block as many as 120,000 Web sites on a state-compiled list, and requiring Internet access facilities 
that are accessible to minors, such as public libraries and schools, to install filtering software.”63 
 
Syria: “ONI testing results indicate that Syria’s Internet filtering regime has increased the scope and 
depth of targeted content. Censorship has been extended to include high profile sites such as the 
video sharing Web site YouTube, the social networking Web site Facebook, and the online shop 
Amazon.com.”64 
 
Uzbekistan: “The 2002 Law on Principles and Guarantees on Access to Information reserves the 
government’s right to restrict access to information when necessary to protect the individual ‘from 
negative informational psychological influence’ … ONI detected a consistent and substantial filtering 
system that employs blockpages as well as re-directs to other Web sites … Selective filtering of Web 
sites displaying social topics was also detected, including sites with religious, extremist, porn, gay, 
and lesbian content.”65 
 
Vietnam: “Surprisingly, Vietnam does not block any pornographic content (though it does filter one 
site ONI tested with links to adult material), despite the state’s putative focus on preventing access to 
sexually explicit material. The state’s filtering practices are thus in obvious tension with the purported 
justification for these actions.”66 
Although other countries do not seem to target pressure groups such as EXIT, Australia’s filtering of 
such sites along with its stated intention to block, for example, MA15+ content which seems to fail 
restricted access tests, would likely see it categorised as at least a selective filterer of social content. 
 
 
 
3.6   Conclusion 
 
Although there are indications of a growing preparedness to filter content in some European nations, 
mandatory filtering at present is very restricted and very targeted. Germany and Italy have both 
legislated to block access to child pornography, while Italy also prevents access to some online 
gambling sites. It is clear that liberal democracies tend to adopt voluntary regulatory approaches that 
focus on narrowly defined segments of undesirable content – usually child pornography. The United 
States, New Zealand, Canada and Great Britain have implemented voluntary programs that delegate 
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the choice of what to filter and how to filter it to end-users, individual ISPs and/or filtering software 
vendors. The identification of undesirable internet content is usually retained under the purview of a 
not-for-profit organisation who maintains a blacklist through collaboration with the police, advocacy 
groups, the government and the general public. The majority of European ISPs filter content 
“voluntarily” under the implicit understanding that failure to do so will force the government to 
implement strict regulatory frameworks. 
 
Given this general European and north American approach to the regulation of the internet, Australia 
is the only western country identified by the international NGO Reporters Without Borders (RWB) as 
being ‘under surveillance’ as a potential ‘enemy of the internet’. Australia’s proposed filtering regime, 
operating at the level of the ISP to “force all service providers to filter private Internet connections in 
each home to remove all ‘inappropriate’ content” is offered as the main justification for RWB setting it 
apart in this way from all other liberal democracies. Since Australia has been singled out in this way 
by RWB for discussing the possible introduction of an ISP-level filter, its implementation would be 
likely to have significant ramifications for Australia’s place in lists which monitor internet freedoms, 
such as those compiled by the Harvard, Toronto, Cambridge and Oxford University-sponsored Open 
Net Initiative. An examination of ONI’s evaluation of countries which engage in filtering of social and 
political content, which do not currently include any western liberal democracies, indicates that an 
Australian mandatory filter would probably qualify the country for inclusion as engaging in ‘selective 
filtering’ of social and political content. This is on the basis of material already judged by Australian 
courts to be legitimately repressed, although it is clear that there is no intention that the public should 
be allowed to scrutinise the up to 10,000 sites to be blocked by Australia’s mandatory ISP filter, 
should it be enacted.  
 
As a parting observation, using the printed charts from the Feb 2008 ONI-based publication, Access 
Denied, and comparing these with the online materials current in Nov 2009, of the 14 countries which 
were judged as using selective filtering of political or social content in the book, two had since been 
re-classified as using ‘substantial filtering’ while a third had become labelled as a ‘pervasive’ filterer of 
online material. All changes over this comparatively short time frame had been in the direction of 
greater repression of material: none of the regimes indicated had become more liberal. 
 
 
 
4.0 Public Interest Matters: A Summary  
A range of public policy issues and matters of public interest arise from the matters we have 
considered above. 
 
Scope of Content 
What types of content will be filtered under a centralised mandatory internet filtering program? Will it 
just focus on child pornography or will broader categories also be included? 
 
A pressing issue that needs to be resolved concerns the scope of content that is likely to be filtered 
under a mandatory internet filtering regime. As discussed above, according to the current Federal 
Government’s statements the proposed policy has been framed as an approach to prevent the 
dissemination of child pornography. The  question then arises of whether the Federal 
Government should not simply define and circumscribe in law the actual categories of material to be 
filtered, with child pornography being the highest priority category. 
 
 
While this may be considered acceptable where filtering is opt-in by an end user (or parent for family 
computers), under a mandatory filtering regime this would result in capturing material that is clearly 
legal but restricted in availability (off the internet) through classification restrictions. Therefore, the 
following questions need to be resolved: 
 
 Will the types of content that are to be blocked under the mandatory internet filter be defined 
in new legislation or will this remain under the purview of existing classification legislation? 
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 How will content which is considered legal content but potentially offensive to minors be dealt 
with? 
 
 
Balancing rights to free speech  
Unlike all other liberal democratic nations, Australia has no explicit protection of the rights to free 
speech or access to information. Whereas in the United States, the first amendment has been used to 
strike down mandatory internet filtering laws; no such protections are afforded to Australians either 
through the constitution or through subsequent Acts of Parliament. The Labor party upon election in 
2007 indicated that they would provide a comprehensive review of human rights issues in Australia, 
and that report was delivered in September 200967. The National Human Rights Consultation Report 
200968 references findings from a Colmar Brunton survey of Australians and their beliefs about 
human rights issues in Australia. This focuses on which rights Australians believed should be 
protected. One of the findings of this research was that those surveyed believed that freedom of 
speech was one of the most important rights, and that people considered it to be one of the 
“absolutes.”69 The committee recommended that amongst other things:  
 
...the Federal Government immediately compile an interim list of rights for protection and 
promotion, regardless of whether a Human Rights Act is introduced. The list should include 
rights from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the following 
rights from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that were 
most often raised during the Consultation: the right to an adequate standard of living 
(including food, clothing and housing); the right to the highest attainable standard of health; 
and the right to education.70 
 
If the government were to implement a mandatory filter, the extent to which this would conflict with the 
right to freedom of speech and access to information is uncertain although it is clear that the scope of 
the content caught would certainly increase the level of the conflict. Australia is a signatory to the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights which explicitly upholds the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
as well as access to information (see below). Similarly the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), in which Australia is also a participant, states that “everyone shall have the 
right to hold opinions without interference and everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression71.” These rights are often used by courts as constituting basic human rights. However, the 
statements are broad in meaning and also carry with them certain “special duties and responsibilities.” 
Article 20 of the ICCPR states that restrictions need to be placed on communications intended to 
promote or incite war or “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”   
 
Article 17(2) states that “(1) no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation; and (2) 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.72” Article 19 
(2) states that:  
 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.73  
 
However, this is followed by article 19(3) which qualifies this right: 
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The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special 
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or 
morals.  
In this sense, while the state has the obligation to protect the inalienable human right of freedom of 
speech and freedom of association, there is also an obligation to protect people from defamation and 
also protect national security, the public order and uphold public morals. It is on such grounds that 
most states which engage in internet filtering have sought to justify its use. The question is not so 
much whether states have a right to protect citizens from a degradation of public morals in the form of 
preventing access to child pornography or offensive material, but whether mandatory internet filtering 
is the most appropriate method with which to pursue this aim. Likewise, in the case of defamation and 
hate speech, the state is in fact obligated under international treaties such as UNDHR and ICCPR to 
uphold the rights of citizens to be protected from communication that undermines the rights of others. 
As stated by Zittrain and Palfrey (2008)74: 
 
The strongest argument for [an] internet filter is that it is a legitimate expression of the 
sovereign authority of states to prevent its citizens from unfettered access to the internet 
when doing so would adversely affect local morals and norms…A state has the right to 
protect the morality of its citizens, the arguments goes, and unfettered access to and use of 
the internet undercuts public morality in myriad ways. Many regimes, including those in 
Western states, have justified online surveillance of various sorts on the grounds of ordinary 
law enforcement activities, such as the prevention and enforcement of domestic criminal 
activity. Most recently, states have begun to justify online censorship and surveillance as a 
measure to counteract international terrorism. More simply, internet filtering and surveillance 
is an expression of the unalienable right of a state to ensure its national security. 
 
In regards to internet filtering there is a fundamental conflict between protecting the rights to freedom 
of expression and access to information and upholding the state’s obligations of maintaining national 
security and protecting public morals. The conflict stems from the nature of the technology and the 
potentially capricious and arbitrary manner in which regulations could be applied. There is no 
evidence to suggest that any state has ever managed to regulate a foolproof system in which 
underblocking or overblocking does not occur75. 
 
Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that all systems can be evaded by some internet users and that 
no technical means of filtering can be implemented that prevents such evasion. The question as to 
whether overfiltering or underfiltering is preferable remains a matter that individual states must decide. 
While it seems that many states have delegated responsibility to individual ISPs, this question raises 
two important public policy questions: 
 
 In the case of overfiltering: is the potential of unwittingly restricting the lawful expression of 
a citizen and their access to information so offensive to fundamental human rights that it 
conceivably constitutes a breach of Australia’s international obligations?  
 
 In the case of underfiltering: is the inexact implementation of internet filtering satisfactory 
given that much content which may be deemed grossly offensive to public morals will not be 
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successfully blocked and may also leave parents and teachers with a false sense of security 
when it comes to children accessing the internet. 
 
 
 
Transparency 
How transparent will the regulatory approach be? Will citizens be made aware if certain websites 
have been prohibited?  
 
While it is clear that the government’s stated intention is the adoption of a mandatory internet filter to 
prevent access to prohibited content, it is unclear exactly how the mechanisms for this will be 
implemented. While preventing access to child pornography is clearly one of the primary reasons for 
implementing this filter, the current ACMA blacklist suggests that majority of websites (61%) on the 
blacklist fall outside this category of material. 
 
A further critical concern is that, under the present system, the ACMA blacklist is not released for 
public comment and, while those hosting content which is put on the list have a right of appeal, 
content creators or other people who could be deemed to have standing in the matter, have no right 
of appeal. Without a right of appeal under public administrative law, there is also no avenue of judicial 
review. While there are well established precedents for exemption from administrative appeal – for 
instance if matters pertaining to national security or the broad protection of public morality – the 
offence to established democratic practice arguably increases exponentially in relation to the scope of 
content being filtered. Given the breadth of material that exists online and is potentially caught by the 
prohibited content provisions it seems to us, imperative, that at the very least the Federal Government 
commits to a clear system of appeal and judicial review of decisions and that there is transparency 
about what is put onto such a blacklist with rare exceptions.   
As of the time of writing, the following questions about how internet filtering will proceed need to be 
resolved:  
 
 Will the blacklist be made publicly available? If not, is there a potential cause of action for 
discovery or redress?  
 
 Will content providers or other citizens be able to appeal the blocking of individual websites? 
How will such an appeals process be facilitated? 
 
 Will there be a system of judicial review? 
 
 
 
Peer-to-Peer Content 
The growth of peer-to-peer and user generated content with the advent of Web 2.0 generates some 
additional regulatory challenges for the Federal Government. A mandatory filter will not catch illegal 
material disseminated through these channels. Indeed, one of the key challenges in identifying those 
who disseminate and consume child pornography is that much of it is not openly displayed on 
websites but is exchanged in a covert and encrypted manner via bulletin boards. More recently, 
evidence is emerging that child pornography is also increasingly being covertly housed on third party 
websites through the use of malware bots. The international evidence clearly suggests that the 
majority of child abuse prevention resources need to be targeted towards coordinated policing of 
those who manufacture and share child abuse materials, often in contexts where they are involving 
their own family members or children known to them76. A key issue that needs consideration is that 
even if abhorrent and inappropriate content is identified and notified to ACMA, or another appropriate 
authority, there is strong evidence that the creators of such material will simply upload or download 
the same material in a different online context once detected. 
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International Implications 
The proposed filtering regime has a number of implications for Australia in an international context. 
Firstly, the proposal would set Australia apart from other western liberal democracies that have opted 
for a transparent, voluntary filtering regime that involves interactions between governments, the 
police, advocacy groups, ISPs, not-for-profit organisations and the general public in determining how 
to counteract access to undesirable content. This approach has been successfully applied in the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. While it is clear that in Europe there is 
a trend towards greater regulation of internet content, especially in Italy, most European countries still 
maintain a voluntary regulatory approach.  
 
Australia’s treaty obligations under the United Nations Declaration for Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) clearly establish Australia’s commitment 
to freedom of speech and expression. While it is clear that if the mandatory internet filter were to 
focus narrowly upon instances of child pornography it could hardly be consider a breach of Australia’s 
international treaty obligations, the implementation of a non-transparent, a widely scoped filtering 
system that captures not only child pornography but legal content could constitute a fundamental 
departure from Australia’s commitments.  
 
 
Balancing Risks with Responsibility 
A mandatory policy also raises the issue of how we balance the need for the government to protect 
children and teenagers from harmful material with the importance of involving parents and teachers in 
helping children negotiate the online environment and make decisions about what is age appropriate. 
International research has repeatedly shown the importance of involving parents, educators and 
children in a dialogue about both their media consumption and the risks and opportunities of the 
online environment. If parents and educators believe that the government has made the internet safe 
for children they may no longer feel obligated to engage in these discussions. It is critical that we 
continue to focus resources on educating and supporting children and young people to become media 
literate and responsible consumers and producers of online material. Getting the policy balance 
between protection, education and family- based negotiation is critical if we are to produce future 
citizens who are prepared for a digital, online and mobile future. 
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Appendix One - The Practice of Filtering 
Any discussion of public policy related to internet filtering is linked to the technology which facilitates 
it. More specifically, the degree to which the technology underblocks or overblocks the content which 
is seeks to filter. The following table provides an overview of the types of different filtering options 
available and their concomitant advantages and disadvantages: 
 
Technique Description Advantages Disadvantages 
 
IP Blocking 
 
TCP/IP Header filtering is 
where routers inspect the 
IP packet header with the 
destination IP being 
located. Routers can be 
configured to put packets 
destined for an IP on a list. 
They only block 
communication on the 
basis of where packets are 
going to or coming from, 
not what they contain. 
 
 
 Effective in blocking a requested 
target. 
 No new equipment needs to be 
purchased. 
 Instantaneous implementation 
 Required technology and 
expertise is readily available. 
 Potential to block at or near 
international gateways so that 
blocking is uniform across ISPs. 
 
 
 Can result in significant 
overblocking as all 
other (unrelated) 
websites hosted on 
that server will also be 
blocked. 
 
TCP/IP Content Filtering 
is where the contents of a 
certain packed are 
examined for banned 
keywords.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Greater specify with regards to 
the type of content which can be 
filtered – based on keyword. 
 By filtering based on keywords, 
the whole IP is not blocked, only 
those packets with the banned 
keywords. This reduces the 
potential for over filtering. 
 Extra equipment may 
be needed.  
 Typical hardware may 
be unable to react fast 
enough to block the 
infringing packets,  
 As packets have a 
maximum size, the full 
content of the 
communication will 
likely be split over 
multiple packets.  
 Keywords might be 
split over a number of 
packets which means 
devices may fail to 
identify banned 
keywords.  
 For packet inspection 
to be fully effective, 
the stream must be 
reassembled, which 
adds additional 
complexity. 
 Sites can be aware of 
this technique and 
simply not use the 
offending keyword and 
select an equivalent 
term. 
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DNS 
(domain 
name 
server) 
Tampering 
 
 
Most websites use domain 
names not IP addresses. If 
the domain name resolution 
stage can be filtered, 
access to infringing sites 
can be effectively blocked. 
A list of banned domain 
names can be configured 
which will display an error 
message if a user tries to 
access a listed site. 
 
 Purposefully disrupting DNS 
servers which resolve domain 
names into IP addresses. 
 Can target a particular website by 
configuring the DNS server to 
return the wrong IP address. 
 
 
 Comparatively easy to 
bypass by the user 
selecting an 
alternative recursive 
resolver. This type of 
circumvention might 
be made more difficult 
by blocking access to 
external DNS servers, 
but doing so would be 
disruptive to normal 
activities and could 
also be bypassed. 
 
 
Proxy-
based 
filtering 
strategies 
 
 
 
Prevents users from 
directly connecting to a 
website but requires users 
to go through a proxy 
server. The proxy server 
may temporarily store 
information in a cache. The 
proxy decides whether 
request for webpages 
should be permitted, and if 
so, sends the request to the 
web server hosting the 
requested content.  Since 
the full contents of the 
request are available, 
individual web pages can 
be filtered, not just entire 
websites or domains. Also, 
a transparent HTTP proxy 
may intercept outgoing web 
requests and send them to 
a proxy server. 
 
 
 Permits the greatest flexibility, 
allowing blocking both by full Web 
page URL and by Web page 
content. 
 Internet traffic passing through 
the filtering system is 
reassembled and the specific 
HTTP addressing being accessed 
is checked against a list of 
blocked websites (can be 
individual domains, subdomains, 
specific long URL paths, or 
keywords in the domain or URL 
path). This permits greater 
specificity. 
 Can also be programmed so that 
internet traffic passing through 
the filtering system is 
reassembled and the specific 
HTTP address requested is 
checked against a list of blocked 
keywords. 
 
 
 More complex to 
establish. 
 This can be fooled by 
redirecting traffic 
through an open proxy 
server. Such servers 
may be set up 
accidentally by 
computer users who 
misconfigure their own 
computers. 
Alternatively, a proxy 
could be specifically 
designed for 
circumventing Internet 
filtering. Here, the 
main challenge is to 
discover an open 
proxy as many are 
shut down rapidly due 
to spammers abusing 
them, or blocked by 
organisations that 
realise they are being 
used for 
circumvention. 
 Encrypted proxy 
servers may be used 
to hide what is being 
accessed through 
them 
 
Hybrid 
TCP/IP and 
HTTP Proxy 
 
Requests are intercepted 
by an HTTP proxy and are 
then reassembled from the 
original packets, decoded 
and then retransmitted. The 
system operates by 
 Allows the greatest flexibility. 
 Reduces overblocking 
 Hardware required to 
keep up with a fast 
Internet connection is 
very expensive. 
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building a list of the IP 
addresses of sites hosting 
prohibited content, but 
rather than blocking data 
flowing to these servers, 
the traffic is redirected to a 
transparent HTTP proxy. 
There, the full Web address 
is inspected and if it refers 
to banned content, it is 
blocked; otherwise the 
request is passed on as 
normal. 
 
 
 
The degree to which an internet filter either over blocks or under blocks websites has important 
ramifications for public policy. Many countries internationally have declared internet filtering illegal 
because of the chance that overblocking content might constitute an infringement of the rights of 
access to information and free speech. The Received Operating Characteristic (ROC) is a 
hypothetical curve which models the trade-off between overblocking and underblocking. For example, 
it is possible to obtain fewer instances of underblocking but this is at the cost of more overblocking. In 
general, the way to improve this trade-off is to devise more precise ways of discriminating between 
desired and undesired results such as results from a greater investment in internet filtering hardware 
and software.  
 
There is also the issue of transparency of internet filtering. In some cases a blocked site will simply 
return an error message giving no indication that the site has been intentionally blocked. Alternatively, 
a warning label can be applied to sites which have been intentionally blocked and also provide users 
with information to allow them to write to authorities to register a complaint that a given website has 
been wrongly blocked. 
 
Another issue comes in the form of under blocking. If filtering is conducted at a centralised location, 
perhaps on the internet backbone at the county’s international gateway, then all internet traffic will 
encounter the same filters. This means that all users in a country will experience the same access to 
the internet. Alternatively, if filtering is decentralised amongst ISPs, then this could result in a different 
level of access to users based on who their ISP is. Therefore, access could be subject to the 
marketing policies of the ISP provider.  
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 Appendix Two – National Classification Code 
for Films 
Item Description of Publication Classification 
1 Films that: 
(a) depict, express or otherwise deal 
with matters of sex, drug misuse or 
addiction, crime, cruelty, violence or 
revolting or abhorrent phenomena in 
such a way that they offend against 
the standards of morality, decency 
and propriety generally accepted by 
reasonable adults to the extent that 
they should not be classified; or 
(b) describe or depict in a way that is 
likely to cause offence to a 
reasonable adult, a person who is, or 
appears to be, a child under 18 
(whether the person is engaged in 
sexual activity or not); or 
(c) promote, incite or instruct in 
matters of crime or violence 
RC 
2 Films (except RC films) that: 
(a) contain real depictions of actual 
sexual 
activity between consenting adults in 
which there is no violence, sexual 
violence, sexualised violence, 
coercion, sexually assaultive 
language, or fetishes or depictions 
which purposefully demean anyone 
involved in that activity for the 
enjoyment of viewers, in a way that is 
likely to cause offence to a 
reasonable adult; and 
(b) are unsuitable for a minor to see 
X 18+ 
3 Films (except RC films and X 18+ 
films) that are unsuitable for a minor 
to see 
R 18+ 
4 Films (except RC films, X 18+ films 
and R 18+ films) that depict, express 
or otherwise deal with sex, violence or 
coarse language in such a manner as 
to be unsuitable for viewing by 
persons under 15 
MA 15+ 
5 Films (except RC films, X 18+ films, R 
18+ films and MA 15+ films) that 
cannot be recommended for viewing 
by persons who are under 15 
M 
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6 Films (except RC films, X 18+ films, R 
18+ films, MA 15+ films and M films) 
that cannot be recommended for 
viewing by persons who are under 15 
without the guidance of their parents 
or guardians 
PG 
7 All other films G 
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Appendix Three – National Classification 
Guidelines (Extract) 
 
RC  REFUSED CLASSIFICATION 
Note: Films that exceed the R 18+ and X 18+ classification categories will be Refused Classification.  
Computer games that exceed the MA 15+ classification category will be Refused Classification. 
 
Films and computer games will be refused classification if they include or contain any of the following: 
 
 
CRIME OR VIOLENCE 
Detailed instruction or promotion in matters of crime or violence. 
 
The promotion or provision of instruction in paedophile activity. 
 
Descriptions or depictions of child sexual abuse or any other exploitative or offensive descriptions or 
depictions involving a person who is, or appears to be, a child under 18 years. 
 
Gratuitous, exploitative or offensive depictions of: 
 
(i) violence with a very high degree of impact or which are excessively frequent, prolonged 
or detailed; 
(ii) cruelty or real violence which are very detailed or which have a high impact; 
(iii) sexual violence. 
 
 
SEX 
Depictions of practices such as bestiality. 
 
Gratuitous, exploitative or offensive depictions of: 
 
(i) activity accompanied by fetishes or practices which are offensive or abhorrent; 
(ii) incest fantasies or other fantasies which are offensive or abhorrent. 
 
 
DRUG USE 
Detailed instruction in the use of proscribed drugs. 
 
Material promoting or encouraging proscribed drug use. 
 
Note: Some of the terms used in this category are defined in the List of Terms at the end of these 
Guidelines. 
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